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Daniel Cash* 
With 2016 providing arguably the most politically tumultuous year in recent history, the need 
for vigilance in the marketplace has never been greater. The proximity to the recent 
Financial Crisis means that any undeserved leniency now may have dramatic and 
irreversible effects. In this short article, the focus will be on the opportunity that the rise in 
automobile-securitisation is offering the Credit Rating Agencies to transgress like in the 
2000s. The article will discuss the dramatic rise in personal financing and the subsequent 
securitisation and will ultimately suggest that action needs to be taken sooner rather than 
later, with the abiding caveat being that there must be a political appetite to do this – 
whether or not this appetite exists will be discussed. 
 
 
Although it will be far beyond this short article to explain and debate the actual process of 
securitisation, it will be good to start with just a simple understanding, and then follow that 
up with a description of the process’ effect upon modern society. The article aims to show 
that automobile loan-backed securitisation (hereafter auto loan securitisation) is not only on 
the rise, but is presenting a real opportunity for Credit Rating Agencies to transgress, in a 
manner similar to that which had a pivotal influence upon the Financial Crisis of 2007/08. 
However, before that, a simple explanation of the securitisation process will be necessary to 
shape the argument that follows. 
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Simply put, asset securitisation describes the process where a number of loans, of any type, 
are placed together in a ‘pool’ – the ability to then purchase a stake in this pool, and thus 
receive a proportion of the overall collection of payments made on the original loans, is then 
offered to investors. How much an investor receives, and when, will be determined by the 
‘tranche’ (French for ‘slice’) in which they invest, with each tranche having different 
characteristics1. Now, for our understanding, two elements are important to explain here. 
Firstly, the loan that can be securitised has no definition – as long as there exists a schedule 
of future and supposedly consistent payments, the loan can be securitised. This is important 
because although residential mortgages dominated the headlines due to the financial sector’s 
general fervour for their trade, there are a number of other options that can, and indeed do get 
securitised. For example, after the market crashed for residential mortgage-backed securities, 
a new market for commercial mortgage-backed securities developed, and was exploited in 
exactly the same way2. So, based on this, we can understand that auto loan securities can 
similarly be developed – the major difference being the time it takes to reach maturity on a 
auto loan compared to a property mortgage. Secondly, how those tranches are differentiated 
is of real importance to our understanding, because essentially it is dependent upon the rating 
that credit rating agencies give to each tranche3. There are a few factors which should be 
mentioned, namely that investors are usually restricted, whether by regulatory or internal 
rules, to which tranche they can invest in, primarily because of what each tranche offers – 
large investors, which must be conservative due to the potential for systemic failure if they 
are not, are usually restricted to the ‘senior categories’ which are rated AAA, the agencies’ 
highest rating (terminologies can differ) – this means that although the returns are smaller, 
they are guaranteed more of their money back if the security fails, which is in contrast to the 
lowest tranche, the equity tranche, which carries huge risk (one is very unlikely to see their 
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money returned if the security fails) but is incentivised by large returns – a staple for hedge-
funds, for example. 
 
To digress for one moment, it is worth noting that the actual process of securitising loans is 
not in itself negative – it is the abuse of the system that is distasteful. The system of 
securitising assets can be extremely beneficial to a number of parties, as has been widely 
recognised in the literature. Choudry discusses how, for the issuing party (usually a bank), 
securitisation offers a ‘double benefit’ in that the assets that are sold to investors generate a 
saving via the reduced need for capital requirements, as the assets are no longer on the 
balance sheets of the banks once they have been securitised and transferred to the investors4. 
Secondly, dependent upon the credit rating of the issuing bank, the bank may see a reduction 
in its funding costs if it issuing securities that are rated higher than it is5. For investors, the 
appeal lays in the understanding that investing in asset-backed securities can help diversify 
their interests, and sectors of interests, access sectors that may not usually be open to them, 
and also to be able to tailor your risk-return portfolio, which is of increasing importance in an 
increasingly complex marketplace6. It has also been argued, in terms of the mortgage-backed 
securities market specifically, that securitisation benefits all parties such as mortgage 
borrowers, capital market investors, and lending and securitising agencies, because a 
competitive lending market lowers the price for all participants7. The process clearly has a lot 
of value, but the impact of abuse is of paramount importance to this piece, and that abuse can 
only really have an effect upon the economy moreover if the credit rating agencies facilitate 
it. Therefore, it will be worth taking a closer look at their role, and the growing market for 
auto loan securities more specifically 
 
Now we know the process, it is worth looking at the development of the auto loan security 
market to do two things: firstly to show the opportunity in reality, and then secondly to shape 
this opportunity in the abstract and relate it to the politically volatile era that 2016 ushered in, 
complete with its fertile ground for financial deregulation. This will be important to 
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contextualise the claim made by this piece - that this growing market for auto loan securities, 
when combined with an understanding that political movements are arguably prioritising 
deregulation, means that there is a perfect storm of factors accumulating – because this may 
allow the credit rating agencies to transgress like they did before the last financial crisis. 
Firstly, however, it is important that we understand the intricacies of the auto loan securities 
market, to better understand the relevance of it and the potential size of the problem if it leads 
to a bubble – clearly any failing in this market will not be as large as the mortgage-backed 
boom, but it still may be significant enough to cause a widespread downturn. The auto loan 
securities market is made up of securities that contain a number of variants of auto loans, 
including secured loans, hire purchases, and financial leases8. The quality of these loans and 
the subsequent securities that are created is determined by the processes of the financier, as it 
has been noted that, generally, vehicle financing companies outsource the investigative stage 
of proceedings to outside companies, and they then utilise that information to underwrite the 
loan9. However, there are issues with the process. There can be problems emanating from this 
process described above – known as the securitisations stemming from ‘captive finance 
subsidiaries of manufacturers’ – as the manufacturers will have an incentive to sell the 
vehicle and will offer incentives like 0% financing to secure the sale, leading to a reduced 
output to be entered into the securitisation process10. Also, there are more abstract concerns 
because, as one scholar notes, the institutions responsible for origination do not own any 
equity shares and therefore are more interested in volume than in quality control11. This was 
witnessed in the mortgage-backed markets before 2007, and the relatively rapid increase in 
the auto loan securities market hints at a similar scenario. 
 
Auto loan securitisation has nearly always existed as long as securitisation as a tool has12, but 
recent reports suggest that financial product is growing increasingly popular. Part of this can 
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be traced to the moves by the large American-based auto companies like Ford, General 
Motors and DaimlerChrysler to increase their presence in the auto loan securities market in 
response to the lowering of their credit ratings in the early 2000s, because the drop in ratings 
increased the costs for these companies to raise funds directly from the capital markets 
themselves13. Moving on to after the Crisis, the Financial Times reported in 2015 that auto 
loan securitisation was set to hit record levels in Europe, nearing €20 billion14, whilst in the 
U.K. it was reported that the rate was set to beat Europe’s entire auto-based borrowing and 
conclude at £31.6 billion for 2016 alone15. Yet, whilst one may not see this rise as 
particularly worrying – in fact, one may see it as a sign of a recovering economy – it is being 
witnessed alongside an element that is a fundamental ingredient for financial crisis, and that 
is abuse. In 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice was already investigating this area of 
securitisation for possible instances of fraud – the exact same issues that blighted mortgage-
backed fraud i.e. the increased availability to people with poor credit scores, and an increased 
competition in the marketplace which is facilitating predatory lending (the Financial Conduct 
Authority in the U.K. is conducting similar investigations)16. In fact, a number of concerned 
onlookers have already suggested that investors are again not aware of what lies behind the 
credit ratings afforded to auto loan securities and their tranches17. Furthermore, it has been 
reported that delinquencies on U.S. auto loans are at a record high18, which should obviously 
lead to concern in light of the ethical standpoints of those peddling this increased finance to 
people who cannot afford it in the long-run. Yet, that warning is not being heeded, as more 
and more people enter into this ever-growing marketplace buoyed by the perceived bonanza 
that is brand-new cars for very little money – in the U.S. last year, the total amount of loans 
outstanding on auto loans rose to $1.1 trillion19. Whilst people continue to be lured by cheap 
finance into what is, effectively at this point, a Ponzi-like scheme, there are no shortage of 
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takers for their peddlers – in a recent offering to investors of £1.3 billion’s worth of 
securitised U.K. auto loans, on behalf of Peugeot, none other than HSBC, Lloyds, Wells-
Fargo, and BNP Paribas, took part in the sale20 – there is clearly no sense of Deja-vu in the 
offices of the financial elite. 
 
Whilst there may not be any sense of Deja-vu in the offices of the financial elite, it should not 
really be of great surprise. Although it would be optimal for these institutions to be mindful 
of their impact upon society, they exist primarily to serve themselves, and this must be 
remembered. Rather than understanding that their transgressions filter through to every part 
of society, these organisations have realised that if their influence is wide-enough, they will 
be rescued by the Government with taxpayer resources. So, with this in mind, it is vitally 
important that regulators do not develop this amnesia, particularly with regards to the 
securitisation process and the role of the rating agencies. There is enough evidence now to 
suggest that credit ratings given to auto loan securities should be thoroughly investigated 
formally, but if we consider the actions of the agencies before, during, and indeed after the 
financial crisis, then this investigation has to happen to prevent another financial failure. This 
is, arguably, hard to disagree with – it would take the staunchest pro-market analyst to find 
fault with this logic, simply because of the consistency of the rating agencies’ transgressions, 
transgressions which the agencies have recently admitted to and been punished 
‘accordingly’21. Yet, 2016 should create huge doubt in our minds as to the likelihood of such 
an investigation taking place, and two particular instances come to mind. 
 
Firstly, in June 2016, the U.K. electorate voted to leave the European Union. The debate 
about this, and the potential outcome for a number of areas has been debated since before the 
referendum, and will no doubt continue to do so. However, what this means is that there is a 
distinct risk that in order to garner increased income in the wake of leaving the economic 
bloc, the U.K. Government will relax its regulatory stance in order to be perceived as 
‘business-friendly’, a sentiment which the U.K.’s current political elite is keen to foster. 
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Then, in November 2016, in the U.S. Presidential election, political outsider Donald Trump 
ascending to the highest Office in American politics and swiftly set about developing a pro-
market, anti-regulation stance – even taking aim at the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act 
in his first week22. Now, it is easy to jump to conclusions and suggest that the current 
sentiment will be continued on both sides of the Atlantic (in addition to a jostling within 
Europe for financial supremacy post-Brexit23) – this we obviously cannot know – but, going 
on the current trajectory, it is easy to suggest that increased regulation of an industry that is 
generating impressive short-term profits is hardly likely to be seen. For this article this is a 
major concern, and represents the political basis of an environment that has traditionally seen 
a mass incorporation of wrongdoing, and then subsequent failures across the board. The 
environment, on the winds of such change, is primed for a positive outcome whereby 
entrenched sentiments within the world of business, sentiments like the pro-market faith in 
market actors to do what is best for themselves, and anyone else, can be swept away in favour 
of responsible business. Yet, the populist movements have been hijacked by those who seek 
to entrench these principles further, and this article ultimately suggests that this 
understanding, so close to 2007/08, should serve as a warning to us all that the Financial 
Crisis of 2007/08 may have only been the start of the difficulties we have faced in recent 
years. 
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